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Learning in anonymous nonatomic games
with applications to first-order mean field games
Saeed Hadikhanloo∗
Abstract
We introduce a model of anonymous games with the player dependent action sets. We
propose several learning procedures based on the well-known Fictitious Play and Online Mirror
Descent and prove their convergence to equilibrium under the classical monotonicity condition.
Typical examples are first-order mean field games.
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1 Introduction
Mean field games (MFGs) are symmetric differential games with an infinite number of non-atomic
players. The model was first introduced simultaneously by Lasry, Lions ([13],[14]) and Huang,
Caines, Malhame´ ([11],[12]). In the game, each player chooses a control and incurs a cost depending
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on their control and the evolving distribution of all the other players’ states. More formally, a typical
player chooses a path γ : [0, T ]→ Rd, γ(0) = x via a control dγt = αtdt and incurs the cost:
J(γ, (mt)t∈[0,T ]) =
∫ T
0
(L(γt, αt) + f(γt,mt)) dt+ g(γT ,mT )
where (mt)t∈[0,T ] ⊆ P(Rd) is the evolving distribution of other players. The Lagrangian L : Rd ×
R
d → R captures the running cost depending on the velocity and f, g : Rd × P(Rd) → R are the
couplings describing the interaction cost of the player with the distribution of the other players.
The optimal control of a player can be obtained by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
−∂tu+H(x,∇u(t, x)) = f(x,mt), u(T, x) = g(x,mT )
with H(x, p) = − infv∈Rd〈p, v〉+ L(x, v). The desired optimal control will be computed as
α˜(t, x) = −DpH(x,∇u(t, x)).
If every player chooses their optimal control, the evolving distribution of players is given by the
Fokker-Planck equation:
∂tm− div(mDpH(x,∇u)) = 0, m(0, x) = m0(x).
Hence the notion of Nash Equilibrium (or stability) is captured by the system of coupled Hamilton-
Jacobi (backward) and Fokker-Planck (forward) equations written above.
The equilibrium configuration in MFGs is quite complicated and its occurrence requires a huge
amount of information and a large degree of cooperation between players. The question of formation
of equilibrium arises naturally. Thus, one would guess that the MFG equilibrium is justifiable
because there is a reasonable way of adapting (or learning) of players via observation and revision
of the beliefs about the other players’ behavior.
There are several learning procedures in games with finitely many players and/or a finite number
of actions per player (see for example the monograph [9]). Here we extend two of the most known
of them to nonatomic games with continuous action sets: Fictitious Play (Brown [5]) and Online
Mirror Descent (Nemirovski, Yudin [20]). In the current article, our main purpose is to prove
the convergence of these procedures to Nash equilibrium in first-order MFGs; however, since the
approach can be used for a larger class of games, we work under a general framework.
Anonymous games model the conflict situations where the dependency of the costs of the players
to the action of their adversaries, are through the distribution of their chosen actions. The popu-
lation game is a class of anonymous games with a set of of non-atomic players who choose among
a finite number of actions (see for example [10]). Mas-Collel [16] proposed a type of anonymous
games with a continuum of players where actions are chosen from an identical set and the cost
functions depend on the players’ types. Our approach here is different; in the sense that actions
may be chosen from different sets, but the cost functions are identical. For example this is the case
in first-order MFGs; the players choose the paths with fixed (player dependent) initial positions as
their actions, and the cost function is identical for all players.
In nonatomic games, Nash equilibria are defined up to a zero-measure set of players, i.e. the
infinitesimal subsets which has no effect on the whole result of the game. Similar to the previous
works (Schmeidler [24], Mas-Collel [16]) we employ a fixed point theorem to infer the existence of
equilibrium under continuity and compactness.
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Here we work under a well-known monotonicity condition introduced in game theory by Rosen
[22]. The strict monotonicity yields the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (Haufbauer, Sandholm
[10], Blanchet, Carlier [3]). A similar definition appears in MFG (Lasry, Lions [13],[14]) which also
implies the uniqueness of equilibrium. In anonymous games with (not necessarily strict) monotone
costs, equilibrium uniqueness is a direct consequence of monotonicity and the ”unique minimiser”
condition.
Haufbauer, Sandholm [10] introduced the stable games as the population games with monotone
costs. They prove the convergence of many learning dynamics including Best Response Dynamic,
Replicator Dynamic, ... to the unique equilibrium. Their techniques have inspired our approach
of the convergence results for Fictitious Play (Section 3) which is nothing but a discrete version of
the best response dynamic.
As introduced by Brown[5] and Robinson[21], fictitious play describes a learning procedure in
which a fixed game is played over and over in repeated discrete rounds. At every round, each player
sets their belief as the empirical frequency of play of the player’s opponents, and then chooses its
best action with respect to this belief. Convergence to a Nash equilibrium has been proved for
different classes of finite games, for example potential games (Monderer, Shapley [19]), zero sum
games (Robinson [21]) and 2× 2 games (Miyasawa [18]). Cardaliaguet, Hadikhanloo [8] proved the
convergence of fictitious play in first and second order potential MFGs. Our approach here covers
a different class of first-order MFGs, i.e. the ones with monotone costs.
The second procedure we consider is Online Mirror Descent (OMD). The method was first
introduced by Nemirovski, Yudin [20], as a generalization of standard gradient descent. The form
of the algorithm is closely related to the notion of No-Regret procedures in Online Optimization.
A good explanatory introduction can be found in Shalev Shwartz[23]. Roughly speaking, the
procedure deals with two variables, a primal one and a dual one. They are revised at every round;
the dual is revised by using the sub-gradient of the objective function and the primal is obtained
by a quasi projection via a strongly convex penalty function on the convex domain. Mertikopolous
[17] proved the convergence of OMD in a large class of games with convex action sets. Here we
examine the convergence properties of OMD in monotone anonymous games with a possibly infinite
number of players.
In the proof of convergence of both procedures to the Nash equilibrium, we define a value
φn ∈ R, n ∈ N measuring how much the actual behavior at step n is far from being an equilibrium;
in Fictitious Play the quantity φn is defined by the best response function and in OMD by using
the Fenchel coupling. Then we prove limn→∞ φn = 0 that gives our desired convergence toward the
equilibrium.
Here is how the paper is organized: in Section 2 a general model of anonymous game is proposed.
The notion of Nash equilibrium is reviewed and the existence is proved under general continuity
conditions. Then we introduce the definition of monotonicity in terms of the cost function, and
its consequence on the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Section 3 is devoted to the definition
of fictitious play and its convergence under Lipschitz conditions. Section 4 deals with the online
mirror descent algorithm and its convergence. Section 5 shows that the first-order MFG can be
considered as an example of anonymous games and shows that the previous results can be applied
under suitable conditions. For sake of completeness, we provide in the Appendix some disintegration
theorems which are used in the proofs.
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2 Anonymous Games
2.1 Model
Let us introduce our general model of anonymous game G. For a measure space X let P(X) denotes
the set of probability measures on X. Let I be the set of players and λ ∈ P(I) a prior non-atomic
probability measure on I modeling the repartition of players on I. Let V be a measure space. For
every player i ∈ I, let Ai ⊂ V be the action set of i. Define the set of admissible profiles of actions
A = {Ψ : I → V measurable | Ψ(i) ∈ Ai for λ-almost every i ∈ I}.
We identify the action profiles up to λ−zero measure subsets of I, i.e. Ψ1 = Ψ2 iff Ψ1(i) = Ψ2(i)
for λ-almost every i ∈ I. The induced measure of a typical profile Ψ ∈ A on the set of actions,
that captures the portion of players who have chosen a given subset of actions, is denoted by
Ψ♯λ ∈ P(V ). More precisely, Ψ♯λ is the push-forward of measure of λ by application Ψ, that is for
every measurable set B ⊆ V we have Ψ♯λ(B) = λ(Ψ−1(B)). Since the set of Ψ♯λ for all admissible
profiles Ψ, may be different from P(V ), it is sufficient to work with:
PG(V ) = { η ∈ P(V ) | ∃ Ψ ∈ A : η = Ψ♯λ }.
For every i ∈ I let ci : A → R be the cost payed by player i. We call the game anonymous, if for
every player i ∈ I, there exists Ji : Ai × PG(V ) → R such that ci(Ψ) = Ji(Ψ(i),Ψ♯λ). In other
words, Ji(a, η) captures the cost endured by a typical player i ∈ I, whose action is a ∈ Ai while
facing the distribution of actions η ∈ P(V ) chosen by other players. We consider here anonymous
games where the players have identical cost function, i.e. there is J : V × PG(V ) → R such that
for every i ∈ I we have Ji = J . We use the following notation for referring to such game:
G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J).
Example 2.1 (Population Game [10]). Set I = [0, 1] be the set of players and λ the Lebesgue
measure as the distribution of players on I. Let N ∈ N represents the number of populations in
the game i.e. there is a partition of players I1, I2, · · · , IN ⊆ I where for every 1 ≤ p ≤ N, Ip ⊆ I
represents the set of players belonging to population p. For every player i ∈ I suppose the set of
actions Ai is finite and depends only on the population where the player i comes from, i.e. for
every population p there is Sp such that for all i ∈ Ip we have Ai = Sp. Set V = ∪pSp. For every
population p the cost function has the form Jp : Sp×∆(V )→ R where Jp(a, (mj)1≤j≤|V |) is the cost
payed by a typical player in population p whose action is a ∈ Sp while facing (mj)1≤j≤|V | where for
every 1 ≤ j ≤ |V |, mj ≥ 0 is the portion of players who have chosen action j ∈ V . The form of
the cost function illustrates the fact that the population games are anonymous.
Example 2.2. In section 5, we show that the First order MFG is an anonymous game with suitable
actions sets and cost function.
2.2 Nash Equilibria
Inspired from the notion of Nash equilibrium in non-atomic games (see Schmeidler [24], Mas-Collel
[16]), we omit the effect of zero measure subsets of players in the definition of equilibria:
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Definition 2.1. a profile Ψ˜ ∈ A is called a Nash equilibrium if
Ψ˜(i) ∈ arg min
a∈Ai
J(a, Ψ˜♯λ) for λ-almost every i ∈ I.
The corresponding distribution η˜ = Ψ˜♯λ is called a Nash (or equilibrium) distribution.
One can note that the definition of Nash equilibrium highly depends on the prior distribution of
players i.e. λ. The following Theorem gives a sufficient condition under which the game possesses
at least one equilibrium. Let I be a topological and V be a metric space (with B(I),B(V ) as
their σ−fields). Suppose the Ai’s are uniformly bounded for λ-almost every i ∈ I, i.e. there exist
M > 0, v ∈ V such that:
for λ−almost every i ∈ I and every a ∈ Ai : dV (v, a) < M. (1)
This condition gives us PG(V ) ⊆ P1(V ) where:
P1(V ) = { η ∈ P(V ) | ∃v ∈ V :
∫
V
dV (v, a) dη(a) < +∞ }
endowed with the metric:
d1(η1, η2) = sup
f :V→R, 1-Lipschitz
∫
V
f(a) d(η1 − η2)(a).
For technical reasons we work with closure convex hull of PG(V ) i.e. cov(PG(V )).
Definition 2.2. We say G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J) satisfies the Unique Minimiser condition, if for
every η ∈ cov(PG(V )), there exists Iη ⊆ I with λ(I \Iη) = 0, such that for all i ∈ Iη there is exactly
one a ∈ Ai minimizing J(·, η) in Ai.
Informally, the definition says facing to every distribution of actions, (almost) every player has
a unique best response.
Definition 2.3. A correspondence A : I → V,A(i) = Ai is called continuous if:
• it is upper semi continuous i.e. the graph {(i, a) ∈ I × V | a ∈ Ai} is closed in I × V ,
• it is lower semi continuous i.e. for every open set U ⊆ V the set {i ∈ I | Ai ∩U 6= ∅} is open
in I.
For more detailed theorems about set valued maps, see [1].The following Theorem asserts suf-
ficient conditions for existence of at least a Nash equilibrium:
Theorem 2.1. Let G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J) be an anonymous game. Suppose the following condi-
tions (H) hold:
(i) the correspondence A : I → V, A(i) = Ai is continuous and compact valued,
(ii) There is an extension J : V × cov(PG(V ))→ R which is lower semi-continuous,
(iii) the function Min : I × PG(V )→ R, Min(i, η) := mina∈Ai J(a, η) is continuous,
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(iv) cov(PG(V )) is compact,
(v) G satisfies the unique minimiser condition.
Then G will admit at least a Nash equilibrium.
Assumptions (i − iv) provide enough continuity and compactness conditions we need for the
fixed point theorem. The assumption (v) allows us to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibrium.
In addition, it is crucial for the uniqueness of equilibrium and convergence results in learning
procedures that we will propose. So we add it here as an assumption for being coherent in the
entire article. Before we start the proof let us provide some lemmas which will be used here and in
the rest of paper:
Lemma 2.1. Define the best response correspondence as follows
BR : I × cov(PG(V ))→ V, BR(i, η) = arg min
a∈Ai
J(a, η).
If the (H) conditions hold, then for every η ∈ PG(V ) the correspondence BR(·, η) : I → V , that is
almost everywhere singleton, is almost everywhere continuous and hence measurable.
Proof. Fix η ∈ cov(PG(V )). According to the unique minimiser condition there exists Iη ⊆ I with
λ(I \ Iη) = 0, such that BR(i, η) is singleton for every i ∈ Iη. We will show the continuity of the
restricted best response function BR(·, η) : Iη → V which completes our proof. Consider i, in ∈ Iη
such that in → i. Set an = BR(in, η). The set {an}n∈N is precompact since A : I → V is a compact
valued correspondence and hence A({in}n∈N ∪ {i}) = ∪nAin ∪Ai is compact. Suppose a˜ ∈ V is an
accumulation point of {an}n∈N. So there is a sub-sequence {ank}k∈N such that limk→∞ ank = a˜.
We have a˜ ∈ Ai since the correspondence A : I → V is upper semi continuous and an ∈ Ain . By
definition J(an, η) = Min(in, η) which gives:
J(a˜, η) ≤ lim inf
nk
J(ank , η) = lim infnk
Min(ink , η) = Min(i, η),
since the Min function is continuous. It yields a˜ = BR(i, η). So every accumulation point of
{an}n∈N should be BR(i, η) which shows an → BR(i, η).
Lemma 2.2. Define the best response distribution function Θ : cov(PG(V ))→ PG(V ) as follows:
Θ(η) = BR(·, η)♯λ, for every η ∈ cov(PG(V )).
If the (H) conditions hold then Θ is continuous.
Proof. Let ηn → η. If J = Iη ∩n∈N Iηn then we have λ(I \ J) = 0. One can show as for Lemma 2.1
that for every i ∈ J :
BR(i, ηn)→ BR(i, η).
Since the Ai’s are uniformly bounded for λ−almost every i ∈ J , the dominated Lebesgue conver-
gence Theorem implies
∫
I
dV (BR(i, ηn), BR(i, η)) dλ(i)→ 0. Thus Θ(ηn) d1−→ Θ(η) since:
d1(Θ(ηn),Θ(η)) = sup
f :V→R, 1-Lipschitz
∫
V
f(v) d(Θ(ηn)−Θ(η))(v) =
sup
f :V→R, 1-Lipschitz
∫
I
(f(BR(i, ηn))− f(BR(i, η))) dλ(i) ≤
∫
I
dV (BR(i, ηn), BR(i, η)) dλ(i)→ 0.
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Proof of Theorem 2.1. Consider the best response distribution function Θ defined in Lemma 2.2.
We have by definition
Θ(cov(PG(V ))) ⊂ PG(V ) ⊂ cov(PG(V )),
which implies that the image of Θ is precompact. Since Θ is continuous (Lemma 2.2) and
cov(PG(V )) is convex, by the Schauder’s fixed point theorem, there is η˜ ∈ cov(PG(V )) such that
Θ(η˜) = η˜. Since Θ(η˜) = BR(·, η˜)♯λ ∈ PG(V ) so if we set Ψ˜(·) = BR(·, η˜) ∈ A then
Ψ˜♯λ = η˜, Ψ˜(i) ∈ arg min
a∈Ai
J(a, η˜) for λ-almost every i ∈ I.
This means Ψ˜ is the desired Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Anonymous Games with Monotone Cost
Here we give a definition of monotonicity and its additional consequences on the structure of the
game and its equilibria.
Definition 2.4. The anonymous game G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J) has a monotone cost J if for any
η, η′ ∈ cov(PG(V )) one has: ∫
V
|J(a, η)| dη′(a) < +∞,
and ∫
V
(
J(a, η) − J(a, η′)) d(η − η′)(a) ≥ 0,
and it is strict monotone if the later inequality holds strictly for η 6= η′.
Intuitively, this condition describes the aversion of the players for choosing actions that are
chosen by many of players i.e. congestion avoiding effect. In other words, on average the players
dislike the crowded actions.
Remark 2.1. If J is monotone and if Ψ˜ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium, then for every Ψ ∈ A we have:
if η˜ = Ψ˜♯λ , η = Ψ♯λ :
∫
V
J(a, η) d(η − η˜)(a) ≥
∫
V
J(a, η˜) d(η − η˜)(a) ≥ 0.
Proof. Since J is monotone we have
∫
V
(J(a, η) − J(a, η˜)) d(η − η˜)(a) ≥ 0 and so:∫
V
J(a, η) d(η − η˜)(a) ≥
∫
V
J(a, η˜) d(η − η˜)(a).
On the other hand ∫
V
J(a, η˜) d(η − η˜)(a) =
∫
I
(
J(Ψ(i), η˜)− J(Ψ˜(i), η˜)
)
dλ(i)
by the definition of push-forward measures. Since Ψ˜ is an equilibrium, for λ-almost every i ∈ I, we
have J(Ψ(i), η˜)− J(Ψ˜(i), η˜) ≥ 0, which gives our result.
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The strict monotonicity yields the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in different frameworks,
e.g. Haufbauer, Sandholm [10], Blanchet, Carlier [3], Lasry, Lions [13]. In the following we show
that in Anonymous Games, the Monotonicity and Unique Minimiser condition are sufficient for the
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Theorem 2.2. Consider a game G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J). Then the game G admits at most one
Nash equilibrium if J is monotone and G satisfies the Unique Minimiser condition.
Proof. Let Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈ A be two Nash equilibria. We will show that Ψ1(i) = Ψ2(i) for λ-almost every
i ∈ I. Set ηi = Ψi♯λ for i = 1, 2. Since Ψ1 is an equilibrium, we have:∫
I
(J(Ψ1(i), η1)− J(Ψ2(i), η1)) dλ(i) ≤ 0,
since J(Ψ1(i), η1) ≤ J(Ψ2(i), η1) for λ-almost every i ∈ I. On the other hand:∫
I
(J(Ψ1(i), η1)− J(Ψ2(i), η1)) dλ(i) =
∫
V
J(a, η1) d(η1 − η2)(a),
from the definition since Ψi♯λ = ηi for i = 1, 2. So∫
V
J(a, η1) d(η1 − η2)(a) ≤ 0 and (similarly)
∫
V
J(a, η2) d(η2 − η1)(a) ≤ 0,
which gives: ∫
V
(J(a, η1)− J(a, η2)) d(η1 − η2)(a) ≤ 0.
Hence by monotonicity of J we should have the equality in the later inequalities. So for λ-almost
every i ∈ I, one has J(Ψ1(i), η1) = J(Ψ2(i), η1) which gives our result since Ψ1(i) ∈ Ai is the
unique minimisers of J(·, η1) on Ai so Ψ1(i) = Ψ2(i) for λ-almost every i ∈ I.
Remark 2.2. One can similarly show that if J is strictly monotone and not necessarily satisfies
the unique minimizer condition, then there exists at most one Nash equilibrium distribution.
3 Fictitious Play in Anonymous Games
Here we introduce a learning procedure similar to the Fictitious Play defined by Brown [5] and
prove its convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium when the game is monotone.
Let G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J). For technical reasons, we suppose that conditions (H) hold
throughout this section. Suppose G is being played repeatedly on discrete rounds n = 1, 2, . . ..
At every round, the players set their belief equals to the average of the action distribution observed
in the previous rounds and then react their best to such belief. At the end of the round players
revise their beliefs by a new observation. More formally, consider Ψ1 ∈ A, η¯1 = η1 = Ψ1♯λ ∈ P(V )
an arbitrary initial belief. Construct recursively (Ψn, ηn, η¯n) ∈ A × P(V ) × P(V ) for n = 1, 2, . . .
as follows:
(i) Ψn+1(i) = BR(i, η¯n), for λ-almost every i ∈ I,
(ii) ηn+1 = Ψn+1♯λ,
(iii) η¯n+1 =
n
n+1 η¯n +
1
n+1ηn+1.
(2)
One should notice that by assumption (H)(v) and Lemma 2.1 the expressions in (i, ii) are well
defined. We will show now that this procedure converges to the Nash Equilibrium when G is
monotone.
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Theorem 3.1. Consider an Anonymous game G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J) with a monotone Cost.
Suppose that exists C > 0 such that for all a, b ∈ V, η, η′ ∈ cov(PG(V )):
|J(a, η) − J(a, η′)− J(b, η) + J(b, η′)| ≤ C dV (a, b) d1(η, η′),
|J(a, η) − J(a, η′)| ≤ C d1(η, η′).
(3)
Construct (Ψn, ηn, η¯n) ∈ A × P(V ) × P(V ) for n ∈ N by applying the fictitious play procedure
proposed in (2). Then:
ηn, η¯n
d1−→ η˜
where η˜ ∈ PG(V ) is the unique Nash equilibrium distribution.
Inspired from [10], the proof requires several steps. The key idea is to use the quantity φn ∈ R
defined by
φn =
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) d(η¯n − ηn+1)(a), for every n ∈ N.
Since the best response distribution of η¯n is ηn+1, the quantity φn describes how much η¯n is far
from being an equilibrium. By using monotonicity and the regularity conditions, one gets
∀n ∈ N : φn+1 − φn ≤ − 1
n+ 1
φn +
ǫn
n
,
for suitable {ǫn}n∈N such that limn→∞ ǫn = 0. We show the later inequality is sufficient to prove
limn→∞ φn = 0 and then we conclude that the accumulation points of η¯n, ηn is the equilibrium
distribution η˜. As one will see, the unique minimiser assumption plays a key role in Lemma 3.2
and hence in our main result.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a sequence of real numbers {φn}n∈N such that lim infn φn ≥ 0. If there
exists a real sequence {ǫn}n∈N such that limn→∞ ǫn = 0 and :
∀ n ∈ N : φn+1 − φn ≤ − 1
n+ 1
φn +
ǫn
n
,
then limn→∞ φn = 0.
Proof. Let bn = nφn for every n ∈ N. We have:
∀ n ∈ N : bn+1
n+ 1
− bn
n
≤ − bn
n(n+ 1)
+
ǫn
n
,
which implies bn+1 ≤ bn + (n + 1)ǫn/n ≤ bn + 2|ǫn|. Then we get bn ≤ b1 + 2
∑n−1
i=1 |ǫi| for n ∈ N
and so:
0 ≤ lim inf
n
φn ≤ lim sup
n
φn ≤ lim sup
n
b1 + 2
∑n−1
i=1 |ǫi|
n
= 0.
which proves limn→∞ φn = 0.
Lemma 3.2. Let (ηn)n∈N be defined by (2). Then
d1(η¯n, η¯n+1) = O(1/n), lim
n→∞d1(ηn, ηn+1) = 0.
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Proof. Let M > 0, v ∈ V be chosen from (1). For every 1-Lipschitz continuous map f : V → R we
have: ∣∣∣∣
∫
V
f(a) d(η¯n+1 − η¯n)
∣∣∣∣ = 1n+ 1
∣∣∣∣
∫
V
f(a) d(ηn+1 − η¯n)(a)
∣∣∣∣ =
1
n+ 1
∣∣∣∣
∫
V
(f(a)− f(v)) d(ηn+1 − η¯n)(a)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1n+ 1
(∫
V
dV (a, v) dηn+1(a) +
1
n
n∑
k=1
∫
V
dV (a, v) dηk(a)
)
.
By the definition we have:∫
V
dV (a, v) dηk(a) =
∫
V
dV (Ψk(i), v) dλ(i) ≤M, for every k ∈ N.
So we can write ∣∣∣∣
∫
V
f(a) d(η¯n+1 − η¯n)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2Mn+ 1 ,
or d1(η¯n, η¯n+1) ≤ 2Mn+1 since f is arbitrary.
For the second part of the lemma, let us consider the best reply distribution function Θ defined
in Lemma 2.2. Since Θ is continuous (Lemma 2.2) and cov(PG(V )) is compact, there exists a non
decreasing continuity modulus
ω : R+ → R+, lim
x→0+
ω(x) = 0
such that:
∀ η1, η2 ∈ cov(PG(V )) : d1(Θ(η1),Θ(η2)) ≤ ω(d1(η1, η2)).
Since for all n ∈ N we have η¯n ∈ cov(PG(V )) and Θ(η¯n) = ηn+1 we have
0 ≤ d1(ηn+1, ηn+2) = d1(Θ(η¯n),Θ(η¯n+1)) ≤ ω(d1(η¯n, η¯n+1)).
It gives our desired result since d1(η¯n, η¯n+1) = O(1/n).
The proof of previous lemma relies heavily on the unique minimizer assumption. Instead without
it, one cannot conclude that ηn, ηn+1 are close even if η¯n, η¯n+1 are so. Even for η¯n = η¯n+1, one
might have very different best responses ηn and ηn+1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let {φn}n∈N be defined by:
φn =
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) d(η¯n − ηn+1)(a), for every n ∈ N.
We have φn ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N. Indeed, rewriting the definition of φn, we have:
φn =
∫
I
1
n
n∑
j=1
(J(Ψj(i), η¯n)− J(BR(i, η¯n), η¯n)) dλ(i),
and the positiveness comes from the definition of the best response. We now prove that exists
C > 0 such that:
φn+1 − φn ≤ − 1
n+ 1
φn + C
d1(ηn, ηn+1) + 1/n
n
, for every n ∈ N. (4)
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Let us rewrite φn+1 − φn = A+B, where:
A =
∫
V
J(a, η¯n+1) dη¯n+1(a)−
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) dη¯n(a),
B =
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) dηn+1(a)−
∫
V
J(a, η¯n+1) dηn+2(a).
We have:
B ≤
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) dηn+2(a)−
∫
V
J(a, η¯n+1) dηn+2(a)
=
∫
V
(J(a, η¯n)− J(a, η¯n+1)) dηn+2(a)
≤
∫
V
(J(a, η¯n)− J(a, η¯n+1)) dηn+1(a) + C
n
d1(ηn+1, ηn+2),
since by (3) and Lemma 3.2 there exists C such that the function J(·, η¯n)− J(·, η¯n+1) : V → R is
a C/n−Lipschitz continuous function. Let us rewrite the expression A as follows:
A =
∫
V
J(a, η¯n+1) d(η¯n +
1
n+ 1
(ηn+1 − η¯n))(a) −
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) dη¯n(a)
=
∫
V
(J(a, η¯n+1)− J(a, η¯n)) dη¯n(a) + 1
n+ 1
∫
V
J(a, η¯n+1) d(ηn+1 − η¯n))(a)
≤
∫
V
(J(a, η¯n+1)− J(a, η¯n)) dη¯n(a) + 1
n+ 1
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) d(ηn+1 − η¯n))(a) + C
n2
since by (3) and Lemma 3.2 we have |J(a, η¯n)− J(a, η¯n+1)| ≤ C d1(η¯n+1, η¯n) = O(1/n). So
A ≤
∫
V
(J(a, η¯n+1)− J(a, η¯n)) dη¯n(a)− φn
n+ 1
+
C
n2
.
Then if we set ǫn = C(d1(ηn+1, ηn+2) + 1/n), by using the above inequalities for A,B, we have :
A+B ≤
∫
V
(J(a, η¯n+1)− J(a, η¯n)) d(η¯n − ηn+1)(a)− φn
n+ 1
+
ǫn
n
= −(n+ 1)
∫
V
(J(a, η¯n+1)− J(a, η¯n)) d(η¯n+1 − η¯n)(a)− φn
n+ 1
+
ǫn
n
≤ − φn
n+ 1
+
ǫn
n
,
(5)
and the last inequality comes from the monotonicity assumption. By Lemmas 3.1, 3.2 inequality
(4) implies φn → 0. Let (η, η¯) ∈ PG(V ) × cov(PG(V )) be an accumulation point of the set
{(ηn+1, η¯n)}n∈N. We have η = Θ(η¯) due to the continuity of best response distribution function Θ
(Lemma 2.2) and the fact that ηn+1 = Θ(η¯n).
Take an arbitrary θ ∈ PG(V ). Since J is lower semi-continuous we have (see [2] section 5.1.1):∫
V
J(a, η¯) d(η¯ − θ)(a) ≤ lim inf
∫
V
J(a, η¯) d(η¯n − θ)(a) = lim inf
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) d(η¯n − θ)(a)
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= lim inf
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) d(ηn+1 − θ)(a) + φn ≤ lim inf φn = 0
since ηn+1 = Θ(η¯n) and
∫
V
J(a, η¯n) d(ηn+1 − θ)(a) ≤ 0 for every θ ∈ PG(V ). So:
∀ θ ∈ PG(V ) :
∫
V
J(a, η¯) d(η¯ − θ)(a) ≤ 0. (6)
We rewrite the above inequality as follows: since η¯ ∈ cov(PG(V )) by Corollary 6.1 we can disinte-
grate it with respect to (Ai)i∈I i.e. there are {η¯i}i∈I ⊆ P(V ) such that for λ−almost every i ∈ I
we have supp(η¯i) ⊂ Ai and for every integrable function f : V → R:∫
I
∫
Ai
f(a) d(η¯i)(a) dλ(i) =
∫
V
f(a) dη¯(a).
Specially for f = J(·, η) we have ∫
I
∫
Ai
J(a, η¯) d(η¯i)(a) dλ(i) =
∫
V
J(a, η¯) dη¯(a), and for all Ψ ∈ A:
∫
I
∫
Ai
J(Ψ(i), η¯) d(η¯i)(a) dλ(i) =
∫
V
J(a, η¯) d(Ψ♯λ)(a).
Combining the previouse equailities with (6), gives us:
∀Ψ ∈ A :
∫
I
∫
Ai
(J(a, η¯)− J(Ψ(i), η¯)) d(η¯i)(a) dλ(i) =
∫
V
J(a, η¯) d(η¯ −Ψ♯λ)(a) ≤ 0.
In particular if Ψ = BR(·, η¯) we have:∫
I
∫
Ai
(J(a, η¯)− J(BR(i, η¯), η¯)) d(η¯i)(a) dλ(i) ≤ 0,
which gives the equality by definition of best response action. So by unique minimizer we have
η¯i = δBR(i,η¯) for λ−almost every i ∈ I. It means η¯ = BR(·, η¯)♯λ or η¯ = Θ(η¯). Hence η¯ = η and
they are both equal to η˜ ∈ PG(V ), the unique fixed point of Θ, or equivalently, the equilibrium
distribution.
4 Online Mirror Descent
Here we investigate the convergence results by applying Online Mirror Descent (OMD) in anony-
mous games. The form of OMD algorithm is closely related to the online optimization and no
regret notions. The reader can find a good explanatory note in [23]. The goal of the algorithm is
to act optimally in online manner by somehow ”minimising” a function that itself changes at each
step. In the game framework it is the cost function; it changes due to change of the acions chosen
by adverseries in each round. As one can notice in the following, we need the structure of vector
space for the action sets.
4.1 Prelimineries
Before we propose the main OMD, let us review some definitions and lemmas.
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Definition 4.1. Let (W, ‖ · ‖W ) be a normed vector space. For K > 0 we say that h : W → R is a
K−strongly convex function if
∀a1, a2 ∈W, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] : h(λa1 + (1− λ)a2) ≤ λh(a1) + (1− λ)h(a2)−Kλ(1− λ)‖a1 − a2‖2W .
Definition 4.2. The Fenchel conjugate of a function h :W → R on a set A ⊆W is defined by:
h∗A :W
∗ → R : h∗A(y) = sup
a∈A
〈y, a〉 − h(a), for all y ∈W ∗
and the related maximiser correspondence by:
QA :W
∗ → A : QA(y) = argmax
a∈A
〈y, a〉 − h(a), for all y ∈W ∗.
One can notice that QA is not empty if A is weakly closed and h is weakly lower semi-continuous
and coercive, i.e.
lim
a→∞h(a)/‖a‖W = +∞.
If W be a Hilbert space (so W ∗ =W ) and h(a) = 12‖a‖2W then the correspondence QA will be the
classical projection on A:
QA(y) = argmax
a∈A
〈y, a〉W − 1
2
‖a‖2W = argmax
a∈A
−‖y − a‖2W = πA(y).
Lemma 4.1. Let h : W → R be a K−strongly convex function and A a convex subset of W . For
any y1, y2 ∈W ∗ let ai ∈ QA(yi), i = 1, 2. Then we have:
2K‖a1 − a2‖2W ≤ 〈y1 − y2, a1 − a2〉.
It implies ‖a1−a2‖W ≤ 12K ‖y1−y2‖W ∗. In particular if y1 = y2 then a1 = a2 i.e. the correspondence
QA(y) is either empty or single valued for every y ∈W ∗.
Proof. Since A is convex, for every ǫ ∈ (0, 1] we have (1− ǫ)a1 + ǫa2 ∈ A. By definition:
〈y1, a1〉 − h(a1) ≥ 〈y1, (1− ǫ)a1 + ǫa2〉 − h((1− ǫ)a1 + ǫa2),
h((1 − ǫ)a1 + ǫa2) ≤ (1− ǫ)h(a1) + ǫh(a2)−Kǫ(1− ǫ)‖a1 − a2‖2.
So by combining the above inequalities:
〈y1, a1〉 − h(a1) ≥ 〈y1, (1− ǫ)a1 + ǫa2〉 − (1− ǫ)h(a1)− ǫh(a2) +Kǫ(1− ǫ)‖a1 − a2‖2,
which gives:
ǫ〈y1, a1 − a2〉 ≥ ǫh(a1)− ǫh(a2) +Kǫ(1− ǫ)‖a1 − a2‖2.
After dividing the both sides by ǫ and then ǫ→ 0+ we will get:
〈y1, a1 − a2〉 ≥ h(a1)− h(a2) +K‖a1 − a2‖2.
By exchanging the role of (a1, y1) and (a2, y2) we have:
〈y2, a2 − a1〉 ≥ h(a2)− h(a1) +K‖a2 − a1‖2.
It yields the desired result if we sum up the two later inequalities.
Definition 4.3. Let F : W → R be a convex function. We say that v ∈ W ∗ is a subgradient of F
at a ∈W if:
∀ b ∈W : F (b)− F (a) ≥ 〈v, b− a〉,
and set ∂F (a) ⊆W ∗ the set of all subgradients at a.
One can notice that if F : W → R is differentiable at a ∈W then ∂F (a) = {DF (a)}.
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4.2 OMD algorithm and convergence result
Consider an anonymous game G = (I, λ, V, (Ai)i∈I , J). Suppose that the following conditions hold:
• there is a normed vector space (W, ‖ · ‖W ) such that⋃
i∈I
Ai ⊆W ⊆ V,
and let h :W → R be a K−strongly convex function for a real K > 0.
• for every i ∈ I the action sets Ai are weakly closed inW and h is weakly lower semi-continuous
and coercive (and hence QAi is single valued),
• for every (a, η) ∈W ×PG(V ) the function J(·, η) : W → R is convex and exists a subgradient
y(a, η) ∈ ∂aJ(·, η) ⊆W ∗,
Let {βn}n∈N be a sequence of real positive numbers. Set an arbitrary initial measurable functions
Ψ0 ∈ A, η0 = Ψ0♯λ, Φ0 : I →W ∗. The following procedure (7) is called the Online Mirror Descent
(OMD) on anonymous game G:
(i) Φn+1(i) = Φn(i) − βny(Ψn(i), ηn), for every i ∈ I
(ii) Ψn+1(i) = QAi(Φn+1(i)), for every i ∈ I
(iii) ηn+1 = Ψn+1♯λ.
(7)
Theorem 4.1. Suppose one applies the OMD algorithm proposed in (7) for βn =
1
n
. Suppose the
following conditions hold:
i. the game G satisfies (H) conditions,
ii. for every i ∈ I the action sets Ai are convex and and exists M > 0 such that for λ−almost
every i ∈ I we have ‖a‖W ≤M for all a ∈ Ai and we have R(M) := sup‖a‖≤M |h(a)| < +∞,
iii. the map Φ0 : I →W ∗ is bounded,
iv. the cost function J is monotone,
v. there exists k > 0 such that:
∀n ∈ N : ‖y(Ψn(i), ηn)‖W ∗ , ‖y(Ψn(i), η˜)‖W ∗ ≤ k, for λ−almost every i ∈ I, (8)
then ηn = Ψn♯λ converges to η˜ = Ψ˜♯λ where η˜ ∈ PG(V ) is the unique Nash equilibrium distribution.
The proof requires a few intermediate steps:
Lemma 4.2. Consider a sequence of positive real numbers {an}n∈N such that
∑∞
n=1
an
n
< +∞.
Then we have
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
an = 0.
In addition, if there is a constant C > 0 such that |an − an+1| < Cn then limn→∞ an = 0
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Proof. See [19].
Lemma 4.3. For every y, z ∈W ∗ and any A ⊆W we have :
∀a ∈ QA(y) : h∗A(y)− h∗A(z) ≤ 〈y − z, a〉.
Proof. The Lemma is obvious since h∗A(y)− 〈y, a〉+ h(a) = 0 ≤ h∗A(z)− 〈z, a〉+ h(a).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let Ψ˜ ∈ A be a Nash equilibrium profile. Define the real sequence {φn}n∈N
as follows:
∀n ∈ N : φn =
∫
I
(
h(Ψ˜(i)) + h∗Ai(Φn(i)) − 〈Φn(i), Ψ˜(i)〉
)
dλ(i).
We first show |φn| <∞. We have∫
I
(
h(Ψ˜(i)) + h∗Ai(Φn(i))− 〈Φn(i), Ψ˜(i)〉
)
dλ(i)
=
∫
I
(
h(Ψ˜(i)) − h(Ψn(i)) − 〈Φn(i), Ψ˜(i)−Ψn(i)〉
)
dλ(i)
and
| h(Ψ˜(i)) − h(Ψn(i)) − 〈Φn(i), Ψ˜(i)−Ψn(i)〉 | ≤ 2R(M) + 2‖Φn(i)‖W ∗M,
since ‖Ψ˜(i)‖W , ‖Ψn(i)‖W ≤M for λ−almost every i ∈ I. In addition by (7)(i):
∀n ∈ N : ‖Φn‖∞ ≤ k(1 + 1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
n− 1) + ‖Φ0‖∞
which proves |φn| < ∞. By definition of Fenchel conjugate we have φn ≥ 0. Let us compute the
difference φn+1 − φn:
φn+1 − φn =
∫
I
(
h∗Ai(Φn+1(i))− h∗Ai(Φn(i))− 〈Φn+1(i) − Φn(i), Ψ˜(i)〉
)
dλ(i)
So from Lemma 4.3:
φn+1 − φn ≤
∫
I
〈Φn+1(i)− Φn(i),Ψn+1(i) − Ψ˜(i)〉 dλ(i)
= −βn
∫
I
〈y(Ψn(i), ηn),Ψn+1(i)− Ψ˜(i)〉 dλ(i)
= −βn
∫
I
(
〈y(Ψn(i), ηn),Ψn(i)− Ψ˜(i)〉+ 〈y(Ψn(i), ηn),Ψn+1(i)−Ψn(i)〉
)
dλ(i)
≤ −βnαn + Cβ2n
where αn =
∫
I
〈y(Ψn(i), ηn),Ψn(i)− Ψ˜(i)〉 dλ(i) and since by condition (8) we have:
|〈y(Ψn(i), ηn),Ψn+1(i) −Ψn(i)〉| ≤ k‖Ψn+1(i) −Ψn(i)‖W
≤ k
2K
‖Φn+1(i) − Φn(i)‖W ∗ = βn k
2K
‖y(Ψn(i), ηn)‖W ∗ ≤ βn k
2
2K
.
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From to the definition of the subgradient we have:
∀b ∈W : 〈y(a, ηn), a− b〉 ≥ J(a, ηn)− J(b, ηn).
So:
αn =
∫
I
〈y(Ψn(i), ηn),Ψn(i)− Ψ˜(i)〉 dλ(i) ≥
∫
I
(
J(Ψn(i), ηn)− J(Ψ˜(i), ηn)
)
dλ(i) =
∫
X
J(a, ηn) d(ηn − η˜)(a) ≥
∫
X
J(a, η˜) d(ηn − η˜)(a) = ψn ≥ 0,
by Remark 2.1. Since βn =
1
n
we have:
N∑
n=1
ψn
n
≤
N∑
n=1
αn
n
=
N∑
n=1
βnαn ≤
N∑
n=1
(
φn − φn+1 + C
n2
)
= φ1 − φN+1 +
N∑
n=1
C
n2
< +∞ (9)
and:
ψn+1 − ψn =
∫
X
J(a, η˜) d(ηn+1 − ηn)(a) =
∫
X
(J(Ψn+1(i), η˜)− J(Ψn(i), η˜)) dλ(i).
From the definition of subgradient:
〈y(Ψn(i), η˜),Ψn+1(i) −Ψn(i)〉 ≤ J(Ψn+1(i), η˜)− J(Ψn(i), η˜) ≤ 〈y(Ψn+1(i), η˜),Ψn+1(i)−Ψn(i)〉
so |J(Ψn+1(i), η˜) − J(Ψn(i), η˜)| = O(1/n) which gives |ψn+1 − ψn| = O(1/n). The later and
inequality (9) yield limn→∞ ψn = 0 by Lemma 4.2.
Since PG(V ) is precompact, there exist a sequence {ni}i∈N ⊆ N and η′ ∈ PG(V ) such that
limi→∞ ηni = η
′. Since J(·, η˜) : V → R is lower semi-continuous, we have:∫
V
J(a, η˜) d(η′ − η˜)(a) ≤ lim inf
i
∫
V
J(a, η˜) d(ηni − η˜) = lim inf
i
ψni = 0,
which yields η′ = η˜ due to the Corollary 6.1 and the definition of Nash equilibrium distribution.
So every accumulation point of set {ηn}n∈N ⊆ PG(V ) is η˜ which gives limn→∞ ηn = η˜ since PG(V )
is precompact.
5 Application to First Order Mean Field Games
5.1 Model
Let us define the first-order mean field games as special example of anonymous games proposed in
section 1. Set I = Rd with the usual topology as the set of players and m0 ∈ P(I) a given Borel
probability measure on Rd. Let V = C0([0, T ],Rd) endowed with the supremum norm ‖γ‖∞ =
supt∈[0,T ] ‖γ(t)‖. For each player i ∈ Rd let Ai = Si,M ⊆ V where:
∀x ∈ Rd, M > 0 : Sx,M := {γ ∈ H1([0, T ],Rd) | γ(0) = x, ‖γ˙‖L2 ≤
√
TM}, (10)
i.e. the action set of every player i ∈ Rd is the paths with initial points equal to i and bounded
L2−norm of velocity. We will explain how to choose M > 0 properly.
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Let P(V ) be the set of Borel probability measures on V and set for every t ∈ [0, T ] the evaluation
function et : V → Rd as et(γ) = γ(t). The MFG cost function J : V × P(V ) → R is defined as
follows:
J(γ, η) =
{∫ T
0 (L(γt, γ˙t) + f(γt, et♯η)) dt+ g(γT , eT ♯η), if γ ∈ H1([0, T ],Rd)
+∞ otherwise.
It describes that a players choosing a path γ has to pay first for its velocity, by the map Lagrangian
L : Rd × Rd → R, and second for his interaction with the population and congested areas, by the
couplings f, g : Rd × P(Rd)→ R. We call the Anonymous Game
G = (Rd,m0, C0([0, T ],Rd), (Si,M )i∈Rd , J)
defined above, a first-order mean field game.
We suppose from now on, that the following conditions (∗) hold:
i. m0 has a compact support,
ii. for every x ∈ Rd the function L(x, ·) : Rd → Rd is strongly convex C2(Rd,Rd) function and
there exists a non-decreasing coercive map θ : R+ → R+ such that:
∃ c0, C > 0 : θ(‖v‖) − c0 ≤ L(x, v) ≤ C(1 + ‖v‖2),
∀x ∈ Br, v ∈ Rd : max(‖Lx(x, v)‖, ‖Lv(x, v)‖) ≤ C(r)θ(‖v‖)
and the map θ satisfies the following growth condition:
∀D > 0,∃KD > 0 : θ(q +m) ≤ KD(1 + θ(q)) for every q ∈ R+, m ∈ [0,D]
iii. the couplings f, g are conitnuous and for every m ∈ P(Rd) the maps f(·,m), g(·,m) : Rd → Rd
are C1(Rd,Rd) and there exist C, b > 0 such that:
∀ (x,m) ∈ Rd × P(Rd) : max(‖fx(x,m)‖, ‖gx(x,m)‖) ≤ C(‖x‖b + 1).
The convexity of L(x, ·) implies that for every η ∈ P(V ) the global cost J(·, η) is lower semicon-
tinuous. It can be shown (see [6], Section 6) if condition (∗)(ii, iii) hold, then there is at least one
minimizer of
min
γ∈AC([0,T ],Rd), γ(0)=x
∫ T
0
(L(γt, γ˙t) + f(γt, et♯η)) dt+ g(γT , eT η)
whereAC([0, T ],Rd) denotes the set absolutely continuous function from [0, T ] to Rd. The minimizer
γ : [0, T ] → Rd belongs to C1([0, T ],Rd) and moreover Lv(γt, γ˙t) is absolutely continuous and γ
satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation:

(i)
d
dt
Lv(γt, γ˙t) = Lx(γt, γ˙t) + fx(γt, et♯η), for almost every t ∈ [0, T ],
(ii) γ(0) = x,
d
dt
Lv(γt, γ˙t)|t=T = −gx(γT , eT ♯η).
(11)
In addition by (∗)(iii) there is M(r) > 0 such that
‖γ‖∞, ‖γ˙‖∞ ≤M(r) (12)
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for every solution of (11) with γ(0) = x and x ∈ Br (see [6] Theorem 6.3.1). The later ODE does
not necessarily posses a unique solution. The uniqueness is more subtle. Define the value function
u : [0, T ]× Rd → R as:
∀(s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd : u(s, x) = min
γ∈AC([0,T ],Rd),γ(s)=x
∫ T
s
(L(γt, γ˙t) + f(γt, et♯η)) dt+ g(γT , eT ♯η).
Then it can be shown (see [7], section 4) that u(0, ·) : Rd → R is Lipschitz continuous and if it is
derivable at x ∈ Rd then the solution of (11) satisfies
 (i)
d
dt
Lv(γt, γ˙t) = Lx(γt, γ˙t) + fx(γt, et♯η), for almost every t ∈ [0, T ],
(ii) γ0 = x, Lv(x, γ˙0) = −ux(0, x).
(13)
It is a classical ODE with initial values and hence it possesses a unique solution. In other words, the
optimal trajectories are unique in the initial points where u(0, ·) is derivable i.e. almost everywhere
since u(0, ·) is Lipschitz. It provides the unique minimizer condition for first-order MFGs. Moreover,
we choose M in (10) equals to M(R) in (12) with
R = sup
x∈supp(m0)
‖x‖ < +∞.
Remark 5.1. If K ⊆ Rd be compact such that supp(m0) ⊆ K, then by Arzela-Ascoli the following
set:
S = SK,M = {γ ∈ H1([0, T ],Rd) | γ(0) ∈ K , ‖γ˙‖L2 ≤
√
TM}.
is precomact in V . For every η ∈ cov(PG(V )) we have supp(η) ⊆ S, so cov(PG(V )) is tight and
hence it is precompact in (P1(V ),d1).
Corollary 5.1. The first-order MFGs defined above, satisfies the (H) conditions and hence by
Theorem 2.1 has at least a Nash Equilibrium.
Under the conditions more restrictive than in (∗), the first-order MFG system defined by a
coupled Hamilton-Jacobi (backward) and Fokker-Planck (forward) equation:

(i) − ∂tu+H(x,∇u(t, x)) = f(x,m(t))
(ii) ∂tm− div(mDpH(x,∇u)) = 0
m(0, x) = m0(x), u(T, x) = g(x,m(T )),
(14)
has at least a weak solution i.e. there are u : [0, T ] × Rd → R, m ∈ L∞([0, T ] × Rd,R) such that
u is the unique semiconvex viscosity solution of (14)(i) and m solves (14)(ii) in distribution sense
(see [7], [13]). After solving the MFG system, the equilibrium Ψ˜ ∈ A is obtained by:
Ψ˜(i) = arg min
γ∈AC([0,T ],Rd)
∫ T
0
(L(γt, γ˙t) + f(γt,mt)) dt+ g(γT ,mT ),
and in addition et♯η˜ = mt for η˜ = Ψ˜♯m0. Lasry, Lions [13] have shown that MFG solution is unique
if the couplings f, g are strictly monotone i.e. for all m 6= m′ ∈ P(Rd) :∫
Rd
(f(x,m)− f(x,m′))d(m−m′)(x) > 0,
∫
Rd
(g(x,m) − g(x,m′))d(m−m′)(x) > 0
We prove that the uniqueness is a consequence of the monotonicity of the cost function J and
unique minimizer condition:
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Lemma 5.1. If f, g : Rd × P(Rd)→ R are monotone, then the MFG cost function will be so.
Proof. Let η1, η2 ∈ P(V ). If we define mi,t = et♯ηi for i = 1, 2 and t ∈ [0, T ], we then have:∫
V
(J(γ, η1)− J(γ, η2)) d(η1 − η2)(γ) =
∫
V
(∫ T
0
(f(γt,m1,t)− f(γt,m2,t)) dt+ g(γT ,m1,T )− g(γT ,m2,T )
)
d(η1 − η2)(γ) = A+B
where
A =
∫ T
0
(∫
Rd
(f(x,m1,t)− f(x,m2,t)) d(m1,t −m2,t)(x)
)
dt ≥ 0
B =
∫
Rd
(g(x,m1,T )− g(x,m2,T )) d(m1,T −m2,T )(x) ≥ 0,
since the couplings f, g are monotone.
Corollary 5.2. The Monotone First Order MFG satisfying (∗) has at most one equilibrium. We
have shown that there is at least one, so the game possesses a unique equilibrium.
5.2 Fictitious Play in First Order MFG
The fictitious play in first-order MFG takes such form: for initial profile of actions
Ψ1 ∈ A, η¯1 = η1 = Ψ1♯λ ∈ P(V )
the players play as follows for round n = 1, 2, . . . :
(i) Ψn+1(i) = argmaxγ∈H1,γ(0)=i
∫ T
0 (L(γt, γ˙t) + f(γt, et♯η¯n)) dt+ g(γT , eT ♯η¯n),
(ii) ηn+1 = Ψn+1♯λ,
(iii) η¯n+1 =
1
n+1
∑n+1
i=1 ηi.
(15)
where (i) holds for m0−almost every i ∈ Rd . Here we apply the convergence result in fictitious
play (Section 3) for monotone first-order MFG. We suppose the (∗) (and hence (H)) conditions
hold.
Lemma 5.2. If f, g : m → f(·,m), g(·,m) are Lipschitz from P(Rd) to C1(Rd) then there is a
constant C > 0 such that:
|J(γ, η) − J(γ, η′)− J(γ′, η) + J(γ′, η′)| ≤ C ‖γ − γ′‖∞ d1(η, η′)
|J(γ, η) − J(γ, η′)| ≤ C d1(η, η′)
for every γ, γ′ ∈ H1([0, T ],Rd) and η, η′ ∈ P(V ).
Proof. Since f : m→ f(·,m) is Lipschitz from P(Rd) to C1(Rd) there is C > 0 such that:
‖f(·,m) − f(·,m′)‖C1 ≤ Cd1(m,m′), ‖g(·,m) − g(·,m′)‖C1 ≤ Cd1(m,m′)
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which means that for every x, x′ ∈ Rd we have
|f(x,m)− f(x,m′)− f(x′,m) + f(x′,m′)| ≤ C‖x− x′‖d1(m,m′),
|f(x,m)− f(x,m′)| ≤ Cd1(m,m′).
Similar inequalities hold with respect to g. We have:
|J(γ, η) − J(γ, η′)− J(γ′, η) + J(γ′, η′)|
≤
∫ T
0
|f(γ(t), et♯η)− f(γ(t), et♯η′) + f(γ′(t), et♯η) − f(γ′(t), et♯η′)| dt
+|g(γ(T ), eT ♯η)− g(γ(T ), eT ♯η′)− g(γ′(T ), eT ♯η) + g(γ′(T ), eT ♯η′)|
≤ C
∫ T
0
‖γ(t)− γ′(t)‖ d1(et♯η, et♯η′) dt+ ‖γ(T ) − γ′(T )‖ d1(eT ♯η, eT ♯η′)
≤ C
∫ T
0
‖γ − γ′‖∞ d1(η, η′) dt+ ‖γ − γ′‖∞ d1(η, η′) = (CT + 1) ‖γ − γ′‖∞ d1(η, η′),
and
|J(γ, η) − J(γ, η′)| ≤
∫ T
0
|f(γ(t), et♯η) − f(γ(t), et♯η′)| dt+ |g(γ(T ), eT ♯η)− g(γ(T ), eT ♯η′)|
≤ C
∫ T
0
d1(et♯η, et♯η
′) dt+ d1(eT ♯η, eT ♯η′) ≤ (CT + 1) d1(η, η′).
Corollary 5.3. If f, g : m → f(·,m), g(·,m) are Lipschitz, then by Lemma 5.2, the convergence
result of fictitious play (Theorem 3.1) holds for the first-order montone MFG.
5.3 Online Mirror Descent in First Order MFG
Here we use the convergence result proved in Section 4 for the first-order MFG which have a
monotone convex cost function J . So let us suppose that the couplings f, g are monotone and
L(·, ·), f(·,m), g(·,m) are convex for every m ∈ P(Rd). It easily yields that J is monotone (by
Lemma 5.1) and for every η ∈ P(V ), the function J(·, η) : H1([0, T ],Rd)→ R is convex.
Let us set W = H1([0, T ],Rd) endowed with inner product:
∀ γ1, γ2 ∈W : 〈γ1, γ2〉W = 〈γ1(0), γ2(0)〉Rd +
∫ T
0
〈γ˙1(t), γ˙2(t)〉Rd dt.
We clearly have ⋃
i∈I
Ai ⊆W ⊆ V,
and Ai are uniformly bounded in W for m0−almost every i ∈ I.
For integrable functions F,D ∈ L2([0, T ],R) and G ∈ R we define y = [[F,D,G]] ∈W ∗ by:
〈y, γ〉 =
∫ T
0
(F (t) · γt +D(t) · γ˙t) dt+G · γT , for every γ ∈W
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After a few computation we have:
〈y, γ〉 =
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
F (s) ds+D(t) +G
)
· γ˙t dt+
(∫ T
0
F (s) ds+G
)
· γ0 = 〈γy, γ〉W
where γy ∈W is the representation of y ∈W ∗ that solves:
γy(0) =
∫ T
0
F (s) ds+G,
d
dt
(γy)(t) =
∫ T
t
F (s) ds+D(t) +G. (16)
or
γy(t) =
∫ T
0
F (s)min(t, s) ds+
∫ t
0
D(s) ds+ (t+ 1)G +
∫ T
0
F (s) ds. (17)
If in addition to the condition (∗)(ii, iii) we have:
∀ (x, v) ∈ Rd × Rd : ‖Lv(x, v)‖ + ‖Lx(x, v)‖ ≤ C(‖v‖+ 1) (18)
then one can easily conclude by dominated Lebesgue convergence theorem that the function J(·, η) :
W → R is differentiable for every η ∈ P(V ). So the sub-differential set is singleton i.e. ∂J(·, η)(γ) =
{DγJ(γ, η)} ⊆W ∗ and the derivative is calculated by:
∀ z ∈W : 〈DγJ(γ, η), z〉 = lim
ǫ→0
J(γ + ǫz, η)− J(γ, η)
ǫ
=
∫ T
0
(Lx(γt, γ˙t) · zt + Lv(γt, γ˙t) · z˙t + fx(γt, et♯η) · zt) dt+ gx(γT , eT ♯η) · zT
or according to our representation:
DγJ(γ, η) = [[Lx(γ(·), γ˙(·)) + fx(γ(·), e(·)♯η), Lv(γ(·), γ˙(·)), gx(γT , eT ♯η)]].
So by the computation in (17) the gradient ∇γJ(γ, η) ∈W is obtained as follows:
∇γJ(γ, η)(t) =
∫ T
0
(Lx(γs, γ˙s) + fx(γs, es♯η)) min(t, s) ds+
∫ t
0
Lv(γs, γ˙s) ds
+ (t+ 1)gx(γT , eT ♯η) +
∫ T
0
(Lx(γs, γ˙s) + fx(γs, es♯η)) ds.
(19)
Theorem 5.1. Suppose a first-order MFG satisfies the (∗), (18) conditions. If the cost function J
is monotone and convex w.r.t. first argument, then the online mirror descent algorithm proposed
in (7) for h : W → R, h(γ) = 12‖γ‖2H1 and βn = 1n (n ∈ N), converges to the unique first-order
mean field game equilibrium.
Proof. The function h : W → R, h(γ) = 12‖γ‖2H1 is 12−strongly convex function and lower semi-
continuous for the weak topology, so the mirror projection QAi will have singleton values.
The game satisfies the (H) conditions. By (∗)(ii) the derivatives fx(γt,m), gx(γt,m) are bounded
by a power of ‖γ‖H1 . Then since the condition (18) holds, there are C ′, α > 0 such that for λ−almost
every i ∈ I:
max(‖DγJ(Ψn(i), η˜)‖W ∗ , ‖DγJ(Ψn(i), ηn)‖W ∗) ≤ C ′(‖Ψ˙n(i)‖αL2([0,T ],Rd) + 1) ≤ C ′((
√
TM)α + 1).
So all of the conditions in Theorem 4.1 are satisfied and the desired convergence result holds.
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Remark 5.2. Since the space H1([0, T ],Rd) is Hlibert, we identify it by its dual space. Hence by
choice h(γ) = 12‖γ‖2H1 we have:
QAi(γ) = πAi(γ) =
min(‖γ˙‖L2 ,
√
TM)
‖γ˙‖L2
(γ − γ0) + i.
by the choice of Ai. Then, the OMD algorithm have such form
(i) Φn+1(i) = Φn(i) − 1n∇J(Ψn(i), ηn), for every i ∈ I
(ii) Ψn+1(i) =
min(‖Φ˙n+1(i)‖L2 ,
√
TM)
‖Φ˙n+1(i)‖L2
(Φn+1(i) − Φn+1(i)0) + i, for every i ∈ I
(iii) ηn+1 = Ψn+1♯λ.
(20)
or in explicit way it takes the followin form: let γˆ0,x = 0 for every x ∈ Rd and:
γˆn+1,x(t) = γˆn,x(t)− 1
n
∫ T
0
(Lx(γn,x(s), γ˙n,x(s)) + fx(γn,x(s), es♯ηn))min(t, s) ds
− 1
n
∫ t
0
Lv(γn,x(s), γ˙n,x(s)) ds− t
n
gx(γn,x(T ), eT ♯ηn),
γn+1,x = cn+1γˆn+1,x + x, cn+1 =
min(‖ ˙ˆγn+1,x‖L2 ,
√
TM)
‖ ˙ˆγn+1,x‖L2
,
ηn+1 = γn+1,·♯λ.
(21)
6 Appendix
Here we demonstrate some disintegration lemmas used in the precedent proofs. Suppose I a Polish
space and V a metric space. Let A : I → V be a correspondence with A(i) = Ai. For a Borel
probability measure λ ∈ P(I) we say η ∈ P(V ) disintegrates with respect to (Ai)i∈I if there are
{ηi}i∈I ⊂ P(V ) such that
for λ−almost every i ∈ I : supp(ηi) ⊆ Ai,
for every bounded measurable f : V → R :
∫
V
f(a) dη(a) =
∫
I
∫
V
f(a) dηi(a) dλ(i).
Theorem 6.1. Suppose A : I → V be upper semi continuous. Let {ηn}n∈N ⊆ P1(V ) with ηn → η
in weak sense. If for every n ∈ N, ηn disintegrates with respect to (Ai)i∈I then the same holds true
for η.
Proof. For every n ∈ N, define mn ∈ P(I × V ) as follows:
for every bounded measurable f : I×V → R :
∫
I×V
f(i, a) dmn(i, a) =
∫
I
∫
V
f(i, a) dηin(a) dλ(i).
Obviously πI♯mn = λ, πV ♯mn = ηn where πI , πV are respectively projections of I × V on I, V .
Since {ηn} are tight and I is a Polish space, for every ǫ > 0, there is a compact set Iǫ ⊆ I,Kǫ ⊆ V
such that λ(I \ Iǫ), ηn(V \Kǫ) < ǫ for all n ∈ N. In addition
mn(Iǫ ×Kǫ) ≥ 1−mn(I × V \Kǫ)−mn(I \ Iǫ × V ) = 1− ηn(V \Kǫ)− λ(I \ Iǫ) ≥ 1− 2ǫ,
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which means the set {mn}n∈N is tight too. Hence there exists m ∈ P(I × V ) and a subsequence
{mnk}k∈N such that mnk → m. We directly have ηnk = πV ♯mnk → πV ♯m which means πV ♯m = η.
On the other hand, due to the disintegration theorem (see [2] page 121) there are mi ∈ P(V ) for
every i ∈ I, such that
for every bounded measurable f : I×V → R :
∫
I×V
f(i, a) dm(i, a) =
∫
I
∫
V
f(i, a) dmi(a) dλ(i).
So since the second marginal of m is η, we can write:
for every bounded measurable f : V → R :
∫
V
f(a) dη(a) =
∫
I
∫
V
f(a) dmi(a) dλ(i).
So what is left is to show that for λ−almost every i ∈ I we have supp(mi) ⊆ Ai. Set f : I×V → R
as f(i, a) = 1a∈Ai . We know the function f is upper semi continuous since the correspondence
A : I → V, A(i) = Ai is upper semi continuous. For every n ∈ N we have:∫
I×V
f(i, a) dmn(i, a) =
∫
I
∫
V
f(i, a) dηin(a) dλ(i) = 1.
Hence
1 = lim sup
k
∫
I×V
f(i, a) dmnk(i, a) ≤
∫
I×V
f(i, a) dm(i, a) ≤ 1,
so
∫
I×V f(i, a) dm(i, a) = 1 which is equivalent to say for λ−almost every i ∈ I we have supp(mi) ⊆
Ai.
Corollary 6.1. Every element η ∈ cov(PG(V )) disintegrates with respect to (Ai)i∈I , λ ∈ P(I).
Proof. Let S ⊂ P(V ) be the set of all measures which disintegrates with respect to (Ai)i∈I . Clearly
S is convex and due to Theorem 6.1 it is closed. Also, we have PG(V ) ⊆ S since for all Ψ ∈ A we
have
for every bounded measurable f : V → R :
∫
V
f(a) d(Ψ♯λ)(a) =
∫
I
∫
V
f(a) dδΨ(i)(a) dλ(i),
hence it gives cov(PG(V )) ⊆ S.
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